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A Russian Billionaire Just Gave $5 Million To The Kennedy Center

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vladimir potanin 2

Billionaire Russian oligarch Vladmir Potanin is celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts by giving it a $5 million gift, according to the AP.

The donation includes funding to renovate the center's Opera House Lounge, which will be renamed the Russian Lounge and redecorated "to feature Russian culture" when it reopens late next year.

It's the first time the Kennedy Center, in Washington, has received a gift from Russia, the AP reported.

Potanin, who is the chairman of Russian conglomerate Interros, is a former business partner of Nets owner Mikhail Prokhorov. His net worth is estimated at $17.8 billion.

Now read about the awesome life of Mikhail Prokhorov >

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The Feds Changed Their Mind At The Last Minute About Lending $730 Million To This Russian Oligarch

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Alexei Mordashov

DEARBORN, Mich. (AP) — The U.S. Energy Department won't follow through on a planned $730 million loan to the North American arm of one of Russia's largest steel companies to modernize its Detroit-area plant.

The Detroit News and Detroit Free Press reported Friday that the conditional loan for the Severstal North America project in Dearborn won't be finalized.

Steel company spokeswoman Katya Pruett said Severstal was "deeply disappointed" by the decision. She said the company will review other financing options to move forward with its plans.

About 60 percent of the project has been competed, but the company was waiting on final loan approval to finish it.

The Energy Department didn't detail reasons for cancelling the loan. Department spokesman Damien LaVera said the project has "merit" but not all projects that receive conditional commitments get green-lighted.

"The additional due diligence the department conducts after a conditional commitment is signed is an important part of the process and is vital to protecting the taxpayers," he said.

The conditional approval was criticized by some Republican lawmakers. California Rep. Darrell Issa compared the loan to the government's $528 million loan to solar panel maker Solyndra LLC, which filed for bankruptcy court protection last year.

Detroit-area Democratic Rep. John Dingell urged the Energy Department in a statement not to "turn their back on projects that create in-demand, well-paying jobs like Severstal."

The planned loan to modernize the plant was announced in July. The project was expected to employ around 2,500 construction workers and create 260 factory jobs.

Severstal bought the Dearborn factory in 2004.

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RUMOR: Mikhail Prokhorov Is Interested In Buying These Ancient Ruins

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temples

It's been rumored that New Jersey Nets' owner and Russian oligarch-extraordinaire, Mikhail Prokhorov is interested in adding some Ancient Greek ruins to his portfolio.

Euronews, as well as Arabian Business both  report that the billionaire metal mogul is considering offering to buy the ruins of Sicily’s Valley of the Temples which are located in the small town of Agrigento. The UNESCO heritage site dates back to 450 BC.

However, the Mayor of Agrigento has said that the ruins are not for sale, even if Prokhorov offered an obscene amount. According to UPI, the Mayor didn't rule out attempting to attract investment in the ruins, something that may cause Prokhorov's ears to prick up.

 

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Even 'Russia's Answer To Paris Hilton' Thinks Putin Needs To Quit

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Kseniya Sobchak Russia

Meet Kseniya Sobchak, the daughter of a prominent politician with ties to Putin, famous for hosting a popular tv show in Russia and christened "Russia's answer to Paris Hilton" by the New York Times.

There's a funny thing about Russia's premier "It Girl": Vladimir Putin got his start in politics working with her father, Anatoly Sobchak, St Petersberg's first democratically elected mayor. "His role in the establishment of a new Russia was colossal," Putin said just 2 years ago on the tenth anniversary of Anatoly's death.

Putin's love for his mentor was so great that he helped him escape from the country in 1998 to escape corruption charges — a reward, perhaps, for helping to shape the clan that went on to create "Putinism".

Unfortunately for Putin, Kseniya isn't her father.

At the huge anti-Kremlin rallies in Moscow on December 24, Kseniya appeared. "I’m Kseniya Sobchak and I have something to lose,” she told the crowd.

As Olaf Koens at the Moscow News notes, she may be the most important Putin critic yet. Just two years ago in an interview with the Guardian she refused to mention Putin, saying only "[Putin] did a lot for my family then and I am proud he was a friend of my father." At the time some were even announcing that her political ambitions were was a Kremlin-backed ploy.

Now that's changed.

“[Putin is] not a bad person,” she recently said on Russian TV. “Do you know what the problem is with the opposition? Everyone’s trying now to find a new Putin. But what we actually need is a new system in which there can be no Putin.”

That even people who appear to have profited so much from Putin's Russia seem willing to denounce it is a big step — and she knows it.

“Everybody now knows I’m on the side of the protesters, and the Western press will probably write that it’s an important sign if even a society girl like myself joins the movement.”

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Oligarch’s $300 Million+ Superyacht Sets Sail For Phuket

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a yacht

We’ve enthused in past posts about ‘A’, the eye-popping 390-foot megayacht designed by Philippe Starck for 38-year-old Russian billionaire Andrey Melnichenko.

The sci fi submarine-looking vessel cost over $300 million to build to the designer’s specs at Blohm + Voss and carries a crew of 35 – all outfitted in Starck-designed uniforms.

The other day Melnichenko’s yacht invaded picturesque Phang Nga Bay in Phuket, Thailand, startling the locals. Apparently only a world-class luxury resort could tempt the billionaire and his gorgeous fashion model wife Aleksandra off the vessel.

A source told The Phuket News that Melnichenko and his wife Aleksandra left the craft’s comforts last weekend for a visit to The Naka Island, A Luxury Collection Resort & Spa, in Phuket. “[Mr. Melnichenko’s personal] chef came ahead and tested the food,” the paper notes. “Then the security team came and had a look around. Only then did the couple arrive “in a futuristic looking landing craft”.

“They stayed on the beach on Naka for about an hour, but the tide was going out,” the source added. Aleksandra was worried about not getting back to their yacht, it seems, and decided not to stay for dinner despite their personal chef’s thumbs-up and declined the offer of a luxury suite. From what we’ve heard of the stunning Naka, they ended up – ahem – “missing the boat” anyway…

James Spotting is the official blog of JamesList.com, the world's smartest luxury marketplace with headquarters in Stockholm, Sweden, offices in Marbella, Spain and representation in London, Frankfurt, Singapore and Miami. JamesList features more than 65,000 private jets, yachts, luxury cars, properties and exclusive watches for sale and rent from a trusted network of dealers around the world. James Spotting tracks the latest and coolest luxury news and trends from around the globe.

PREDICTION: These Will Be The 20 Biggest Yachts On The High Seas In 2012 >

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DISCOVERED: The Next Italian Vacation Spot For Russian Billionaires

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svetlanamedvedeva

A luxury Italian spa hotel is preparing to play host to an unexpected visitor from Moscow: the wife of the outgoing president, Dmitry Medvedev, the Guardian reports.

The Hotel La Pace in Montecatini Terme, which has been graced by the likes of Giuseppe Verdi, Paul Cézanne, Clark Gable, Grace Kelly, Audrey Hepburn, and Arnold Schwarzenegger during its 142-year history, will be occupied for a week by Svetlana Medvedeva, her son, and a 30-strong entourage, including bodyguards and translators.

While Medvedeva, 46, does not have a reputation for a lavish lifestyle, the Tuscan hotel, with rooms priced at €600 ($787) a night and suites at up to €1,300 ($1,705) must have looked like the perfect place to splurge, especially now that she has no duties of a president's spouse to perform. 

Her decision prompted staff to hurriedly re-open the hotel, which was shut for the winter, as Italian police made security arrangements in the town.

Medvedeva's visit followed promotional trips made to Moscow by hotel managers, according to the Italian daily Corriere Fiorentino. The hotel and local officials hope her visit will encourage more Russian oligarchs and their wives to replicate her trip, just as Roman Abramovich's visit to Tuscany and Putin's stay at Berlusconi's villa in Sardinia did.

Giuseppe Bellandi, the mayor of Montecatini Terme, said signs in the town would now be written in Cyrillic as well as English and Italian.

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A Second Rusal Chairman Rebels Against Oleg Deripaska

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MOSCOW—Victor Vekselberg, chairman of the board of directors of United Company Rusal, has done what no Russian business partner of Oleg Deripaska has dared to do before, with one exception – announced publicly, and to Deripaska’s face, that Deripaska has violated his signed agreements and brought discredit on his business. Vekselberg, who once proposed selling his Siberian Ural Aluminium (SUAL) company to Mikhail Chernoy (Michael Cherney), rather to Deripaska, now joins Chernoy in charging Deripaska with dereliction of his fiduciary duty, and worse. Cherney, the exception now joined by Vekselberg, takes Deripaska to trial in London in June.

It is unprecedented in Russian business for the chairman of the board of a major Russian company to make a public attack on the competence and propriety of the chief executive. This is because the board chairman of a Russian public company is generally the control shareholder, or the trustee of the control shareholder. But in this case, Vekselberg with 15.8% of the Rusal shares (shared with his partner Len Blavatkin) is implicitly challenging Deripaska’s nominal shareholding of 47.41%, hinting at what is widely suspected in Moscow – that Deripaska doesn’t himself control that bloc, and can be called to account for the loss of Rusal value by those who do.

It is also unprecedented for Russian businessmen of Vekselberg’s financial size to resign in protest. They usually come to terms with their antagonists or rivals in a sale and purchase transaction that buries acrimony and buys silence.

Vekselberg issued this statement today on the website of his Moscow holding company Renova, resigning immediately as chairman of the Rusal board of directors and withdrawing also as a director. “It is with great regret that I have to state that, due to the actions of its management, UC Rusal is presently facing a deep crisis, as a result of which UC Rusal has, in my opinion, deteriorated from an international aluminum leader into a company overburdened with debt and entangled in numerous lawsuits and social conflicts. As Chairman and director, I disagreed with a number of decisions in relation to the company’s strategic development, modernization of production and social and human resources policies, some of which were adopted by management without Board approval and in breach of shareholder agreements. In view of this, I do not consider it appropriate to maintain my current position as the Chairman and a director of UC Rusal’s Board.”

Through his spokesman, Vekselberg declined to amplify for the time being what “strategic decisions”, “social conflicts”, and “social and human resources policies” his itemization refers to.

Rusal has reacted, counter-attacking Vekselberg, and charging him with absenting himself from board meetings. The company statement fails to address the central charge in Vekselberg’s announcement – that Deripaska runs the company without consultation or agreement with either his shareholders or the board. At least one of their conflicts is well-known – Vekselberg, Blavatnik, and Mikhail Prokhorov (with 17.02% of the shares) have wanted Rusal to sell its 25% stake in Norilsk Nickel at the premium price offered, and end the conflict with Vladimir Potanin, Norilsk Nickel’s control shareholder.

The cost of Deripaska’s refusal is that Rusal’s share price is currently 43% below its January 2010 initial public offering (IPO) price.

Just minutes after Vekselberg’s resignation was issued, and as the Rusal share price started plummeting on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, trading was suspended at the company’s request.

 

According to Rusal, “following media reports published in regards to Mr Vekselberg’s decision to resign as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company, UC RUSAL considers it necessary to make the following statement. The issue related to the change of the Board Chairman had been discussed on several occasions during recent Board meetings and further discussions were scheduled to take place at the forthcoming Board meeting on 16 March 2012. These discussions centred on improving the efficiency of the Board and were deemed necessary by the fact that Mr Vekselberg had failed to perform his functions as a public company board chairman over the past 12 months. In his role as an acting Chairman of the Board, Mr Vekselberg has not attended any of the live board meetings dating back to February 2011, was not present at the Annual General Shareholders’ meeting on 25 June 2011 in Hong Kong; neither had he taken part in any investor meetings over the year.

“In this respect, the decision of Mr Veskelberg to resign as Chairman of the Board preempted the anticipated consideration of this matter by the Board. In line with the best international practices of corporate governance, UC RUSAL will endeavor to appoint Independent [sic] director as Chairman of Board, which will undoubtedly raise the efficiency of the Board.”

Vekselberg holds 15.8% of Rusal’s shares in partnership with Len Blavatkin, the co-owner of SUAL when it was merged with Rusal on Kremlin orders in October 2006. At the time, SUAL was aiming at an independent listing on the London Stock Exchange, piloted by the then chief executive, Brian Gilbertson, the international mining entrepreneur and former chief executive of BHP Billiton. Gilbertson was the first chairman of the Rusal board until Deripaska forced him out in 2007.

The value of Vekselberg’s and Blavatkin’s stake in Rusal has dropped from $3.4 billion at the January 2010 listing in Hong Kong to $1.9 billion at today’s trading halt.

Vekselberg’s break with Deripaska comes almost nine years after Roman Abramovich ended his business partnership with Deripaska. According to Abramovich’s recent testimony in the UK High Court in the trial of Boris Berezovsky’s compensation claims, “we agreed with Mr Deripaska that we’ll finish our relationship because the relationship between our managing teams were very stressed, we knew it wouldn’t lead to anything good and that would put an end to our joint business.”

For Abramovich’s term “managing teams”, as for Vekselberg’s term “management”, there is just one and the same reference. But for the former’s pains, the takeaway price was $2 billion in 2003-2004 dollars. For the latter, there is the prospect of less, much less.

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A Bitter War Of Words Has Broken Out Between Two Of Russia's Richest Men At The World's Biggest Aluminum Producer

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Vekselberg Russia

MOSCOW (AP) — A bitter war of words broke out Tuesday between two of Russia's richest men after Viktor Vekselberg quit as chairman of Rusal, the world's largest aluminum producer.

The resignation marks an unusually public spat among the secretive ranks of Russia's corporate community and prompted a rebuke of Vekselberg's conduct as chairman by fellow billionaire Oleg Deripaska, who controls Rusal.

Rusal, which is valued at around euro12 billion, requested a suspension in its shares as the resignation was announced. At the time, they were trading 1.3 percent lower on the day on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

In a statement posted on his Renova holding company late Monday, Vekselberg said mismanagement at Rusal has wrought devastating damage on the company.

"Rusal has, in my opinion, deteriorated from an international aluminum leader into a company overburdened with debt and entangled in numerous lawsuits and social conflicts," he said.

Vekselberg is Rusal's third-largest shareholder and holds a 15.8 percent stake in the company. He had chaired the board of the world's largest aluminum producer since its founding in 2007. Rusal's debt at the end of September stood at $10.9 billion.

In a statement, Rusal, which is 47 percent owned by Deripaska's holding company, indicated that Vekselberg had jumped before he was pushed. The company noted that Vekselberg had failed to attend any live board meetings since February last year and had missed the annual shareholder meeting in June.

"The decision of Mr. Vekselberg to resign as chairman of the board pre-empted the anticipated consideration of this matter by the board," Rusal said.

An independent director will be appointed to replace Vekselberg, Rusal said.

Vekselberg, whose personal wealth is estimated at $12.4 billion by Forbes magazine, came to prominence in the 1990s as a member of the powerful business community, known collectively as oligarchs. He owned and ran an array of oil and metals assets before winding up most of his business activities in 2010 to focus on the state-sponsored Skolkovo innovation center.

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Meet The 19 Richest Billionaires In Europe

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stretch limo, europe, wedding

Europe may be on the rocks, but there's still huge amounts of wealth on the continent.

We decided to take Forbes recent list of top billionaires and look for those from the old world.

Worth noting is the one country that dominates the list, as well as the notable countries that do not feature at all.

#19 - Viktor Vekselberg

Rank: 64

Wealth: $12.4 B

Industry: oil, metals

Country of citizenship: Russia

Fact: Vekselberg is currently engaged in a bitter war of words over Rusal, the world's biggest aluminum producer.

Source: Forbes



#18 - Francois Pinault

Rank: 59

Wealth: $13 B

Industry: Retail

Country of citizenship: France

Fact: Pinault's son, Francois-Henri, is being sued by former model Linda Evangelista for $46,000 a month in child support, even though he is currently married to Salma Hayek.

Source: Forbes

 



#17 - Mikhail Prokhorov

Rank: 58

Wealth: $13.2 B

Industry: Investments

Country of citizenship: Russia

Fact: Prokhorov recently ran for Russian president, but whether he's a true democrat or a Kremlin-stooge is still fiercely debated.

Source: Forbes



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THE CHELYABINSK SHOWDOWN: A Russian Oligarch Gets Lucky At Australian Mines

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MNK Showdown Helmer

Captain Matthew Flinders was a late 18th century British Navy captain and one of the greatest explorer navigators of his time. His circumnavigation around the southern continent he called Australia also led to the naming of dozens of places by his name, along with a species of local citrus tree. He spent so much time at sea, and so little at home, he wrote a book about his shipboard companion which he entitled Trim, Being the True Story of a Brave Seafaring Cat.

Understandably, Flinders Mines (FMS) thought their hole in the ground in Western Australia should be named after the captain, though after their six-month brush with the Russians, Trim might have been more apt. Here’s the tale so far.

Victor Rashnikov, owner of Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine (MMK), won’t be claiming to own anything with the Flinders name after today’s court hearing in Chelyabinsk. Having concealed his intention towards Flinders Mines from the MMK board, public shareholders, Gazprombank, the Kremlin, and the stock markets of the world, his mutism is shamed by the cat.

Russian business, however, is business, and for all his customary bravado, this is an episode which proves that Rashnikov is far from being the master of his own ship.

In a predictably brief proceeding this morning, Judge Natalia Bulavintseva ruled that she would not hear evidence and argument on the merits of MMK’s takeover of Flinders Mines, as she has previously scheduled for today. Instead, she ruled that she is postponing the next hearing until July 2. At that time, Bulavintseva has also ruled, reversing a decision she issued on May 2, she will close her courtroom, and enable the phantom plaintiff, Elena Egorova, to obtain confidential MMK documents to prove her case that the Flinders Mines deal is a bad one.

The postponement comes two days after the quit-date for MMK to finalize its deal to acquire Flinders Mines. According to their scheme of arrangement, “the quit date for the deal is June 30, 2012. The wording says: “Quit date means 30 June 2012 or such later date as MMK and Flinders may agree in writing.”

It is therefore likely that, without ever exposing a company secret, minute of the board of directors, or indeed anything worth saying, Rashnikov has persuaded the Russian judge to let him exit without even the obligation to pay Flinders Mines a transaction break fee of A$2.5 million. There isn’t a major steelmaker in Russia who doesn’t think Rashnikov has manipulated the entire court case. They differ only on whether Rashnikov was taking orders from the Kremlin.

MMK’s annual general meeting of shareholders will convene tomorrow, May 25, and Rashnikov can be expected to say he cannot comment on the case because it is sub judice. If the audience dared, they would roll their eyes at that one.

The initiative now passes to Flinders Mines in Australia. Its share price was stuck at 16 cents in Australian Stock Exchange trading before the Chelyabinsk court began today. It cannot appeal against a postponement; but its lawyers are due to appear in the appeal court next week in Chelyabinsk to argue against the injunction preventing closure of the MMK acquisition. This is due to be heard on May 30 by Judge Galina Fedina. Bulavintseva may have decided to pass the buck to Fedina; she may decide to pass it back on the ground that until the merits of the case are presented in court, the safest thing is to preserve the injunction.

Both judges may be waiting for decision-making authority over the Russian steel and iron-ore mining sector to pass into new hands. Fedina isn’t likely to favour dropping the injunction on appeal, if Bulavintseva doesn’t dare hear the full case until July 2. The two judges can’t be blamed for their lack of foresight on steel investment and foreign policy issues that properly should be decided in Moscow. Without Igor Sechin in charge of the entire resources sector since the start of this week, the hands on this tiller may be President Vladimir Putin’s; or those of his new chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov; or Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, or his factota, Arkady Dvorkovich and Igor Shuvalov.

It may be time for Flinders Mines and its shareholders to decide that they are better off not extending the quit date, and letting MMK go. If the Australians have been telling the truth in the asides they have been slipping to hedge fund investors, there’s a Chinese and a Japanese buyer for their hole in the ground. For the bidding to start on a new acquisition, the MMK deal must be concluded. That is probably what has happened today.

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A Russian Tycoon Is Suing The 'King Of Diamonds' For $1 Billion

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Lev Leviev Russia

The head of Angola's secret service made "fraudulent representations" to induce a settlement between two oligarchs warring over their African diamond interests, the high court in London has heard, as a controversial Russian tycoon launched a $1bn claim against a rival known as the King of Diamonds.

Arkady Gaydamak, best known in the UK as the father of the former Portsmouth FC owner Sacha, is suing his former business partner, diamond billionaire Lev Leviev, over claims Leviev failed to pay dividends earned trading diamonds from Angola. Gaydamak had previously received monthly payments from Leviev of "on average $3m" from 2000 to 2003.

The dispute centres on the pair's interest in a diamond sales operation called Ascorp, previously thought to be jointly owned by the Angolan government, Leviev and Antwerp-based Omega Diamonds. Gaydamak claims he owned a secret stake in the business, which held an exclusive deal to market the country's gems in an effort to prevent rebel fighters being funded from the proceeds of so-called blood diamonds.

Angola's efforts to force a truce in the case and avoid further negative publicity for the country emerged as Gaydamak, who was forced to give evidence via a video link as he fears arrest in the UK over his French tax affairs, admitted to signing a document giving up his claims to the diamond operations. However the businessman insists he was "induced to do so by fraudulent misrepresentations made on behalf of [Leviev] by one General Kopelipa, a highly influential member of the Angolan administration".

In August 2011, "General Kopelipa turned up at [Gaydamak's] hotel in Luanda, armed with copies of the draft settlement agreement drawn up by [Leviev's] London lawyers," Gaydamak's written evidence states. "Kopelipa informed [Gaydamak] that the presidential administration had approved the draft and that its terms were not negotiable, and pressured him to sign it there and then."

Apart from pointing to the existence of the settlement agreement, Leviev argues there was no signed contract between the pair when Ascorp was created. Gaydamak disputes that claim, arguing that a document dating to December 2001 was entrusted to the chief rabbi of Russia, Berel Lazar. Rabbi Lazar says an envelope containing a document "might have [been] shredded by accident" but he is refusing to come to London to testify in person.

The opening of the case is the latest in a line of infamous skirmishes involving Gaydamak, who last year succeeded in getting a conviction for illegal arms dealing overturned in the Paris court of appeal. Charges of tax fraud were upheld, however.

The image of Gaydamak's colourful business career is enhanced by his evidence, including insights into how he forged close relationships with the Angolan government during its civil war by constructing deals to sell it $70m worth of helicopters, as well as being involved in the "logistics and financing of the legal supply of arms, weapons and food to the official Angolan army".

The court also heard lengthy exchanges between Justin Fenwick QC, for Leviev, and Gaydamak over why the claimant felt compelled to hide his shareholding in Ascorp when he was "openly involved with Mr Leviev in 2000". Gaydamak claimed his legal troubles in France meant he was protecting Leviev, although the businessman was not forced to leave France until the end of 2000 when Ascorp had already been established.

The case continues.

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Russian Oligarch Roman Abramovich Has Some Really Awesome Toys

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roman abramovich life

Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich is worth $12.1 billion. That makes him the 68th richest person in the world, according to Forbes.

He made his fortune as the main owner of private investment company Millhouse LLC, and he's known outside Russia as the owner of the Chelsea Football Club, an English Premier League football team.

Abramovich was orphaned as a child. He went to public schools and was an average student.

But today has one of the most fabulous lives in the world. From his gorgeous girlfriend and palatial home to his massive security staff and celebrity-studded parties, you'll hate him by the time you finish reading this.

Abramovich is the owner of Chelsea Football Club, one of the top soccer teams in the world.

Source: The Independent



His frenemy is fellow oligarch Boris Berezovsky. The two bought a controlling stake in an oil company, now they're battling over $6.5 billion in court.

Source: The Guardian



Abramovich has a security staff of 40 people, which reportedly costs him $2 million a year.

Source: The Daily Mail



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BP And Russian Oligarchs May Have Reached 'Endgame' Over Their Joint Venture

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mikhail fridman

It's almost a year to the day since BP and the oligarchs at Alfa-Access-Renova (AAR) agreed to bury the hatchet and "intensify their efforts" to ensure the "continued success" of their TNK-BP joint venture in Russia. Few believed then the pair could sustain the appearance of harmony for long: the bitterness caused by BP's (doomed) attempt to agree a separate deal with Rosneft to explore the Arctic ran too deep. Even fewer will believe in a happy ending after the latest development – the resignation of Mikhail Fridman, one of the four tycoons, as chief executive of TNK-BP.

BP is whistling cheerfully that Fridman's role in the post has "largely been ceremonial" but its own chief executive, Bob Dudley, carries enough scars from past dealings in Russia to be wary. The natural interpretation of Fridman's resignation is that AAR wants something, which is why the air is thick with talk of a "breakdown in governance" at TNK-BP and the arrival of "the endgame" for the relationship. The question is what AAR wants.

It's probably not a desire for BP to repeat last year's offer to buy AAR's holding for $36bn (£22.95bn). It seems more likely that the oligarchs would wish to pitch for all or part of BP's 50% shareholding. But BP certainly isn't going to agree to be a minority investor – that would be inviting more trouble. And Dudley knows he would lose his job if he agreed to sell at less than a soaraway price, which AAR seems very unlikely to offer.

So prepare for the endgame, if that's what it is, to be messy. One immediate battleground is TNK-BP's dividend. It disappeared last quarter because after the resignation of two independent board members last December there aren't enough directors to sanction a payout. A few quarters of delay can be tolerated by BP. But the oligarchs' calculation may be that a dividend-gusher, which is what TNK-BP is meant to be, becomes gradually less valuable for a UK oil giant if the cash doesn't arrive reliably.

Fridman may also have noticed the decline in BP's share price, which has lost touch with 500p since February and on Monday slipped below 400p. That's remarkable when you remember that the post-Macondo low was only 320p. From the point of view of a strategically minded oligarch, it's the perfect moment to create fresh worries for BP shareholders. It's still May, but Dudley should prepare for a long Russian winter.

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ABRAMOVICH DOES IT AGAIN: Takes $69 Million In Public Shareholder Value For One Of His Pocket Assets

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roman abramovich

What an enterprising lad! While Highland Gold, a London-listed public stockholding company, was looking in a forward direction, last Friday Roman Abramovich sold it a gold and silver prospect called Klen for the greater part of which he had paid $103,774 eighteen months earlier. Abramovich has now relieved Highland Gold of $69 million of its hard-earned money for this exchange. In the interval, since Abramovich spent peanuts on prospecting, his rate of return was 34% per month, 610% overall.

This, at least, is one arithmetic of what has happened. Abramovich’s spokesman, John Mann, says there is another truer one, although one of the crucial numbers in that calculation is missing. Highland Gold’s spokesman, Dmitry Yakushkin, isn’t providing that number. Nor is he explaining how Highland Gold counts the reserves and resources which Abramovich has just sold it.

Numis Securities, a London brokerage, which is the nominated (paid) financial advisor to Highland Gold, was asked to say whether $69 million for Klen was a fair and reasonable price. According to the Highland Gold announcement, Numis has calculated very carefully and reported: “Numis Securities Limited, consider that the terms of the said transaction are fair and reasonable insofar as the shareholders of the Company are concerned.” It isn’t known which of the shareholders of Highland Gold Numis had in mind, if not Abramovich and his Millhouse holding, which control 32.6%.

Numis cannot have been thinking of the Canadian goldminer, Barrick Gold, because it had completed selling off all of its 20.37% stake in Highland Gold by April 26, little more than a month before the Klen deal was announced. Company managers own 8% of Highland Gold, and 59.4% is classified as in “public hands”. They have lost 3% of the value of their shares since the Klen transaction was announced.

A geologist employed by Highland Gold, with a degree in his subject from the University of Toronto, is reported in the June 1 deal announcement as “having reviewed and verified the information contained in this release with respect to reserve and resource matters.” As he wasn’t asked to count the reserves and resources in 2010, when they were worth $103,774, and calculate if there had been any increase until last Friday, when they were worth $69 million, his expertise is limited, if not to say irrelevant.

In fact, the value of Abramovich’s property, located near Bilbino in the north central area of the Chukotka region, has dwindled sharply over this time period.

According to the Prime-Tass announcement of November 26, 2010, the Chukotka division of the federal Ministry of Natural Resources estimated the mineable resources of the Verkhne-Krichalskaya licence area as 32 tonnes of gold (1 million troy ounces) and 69 tonnes of silver (2.2 million oz). Then in February of this year, during a public hearing called to consider the environmental impact of mining in the area, the Klen reserves were reported to be 18.6 tonnes (598,000 oz) of gold, 43.8 tonnes (1.4 million oz) of silver. Allowing for imprecision in the terms, reserves and resources, as well as in the geography of Klen and Verkhne-Krichalskaya, about 40% of Abramovich’s gold seems to have disappeared, and 37% of the silver.

The June 1 announcement from Highland Gold announcing the sale and purchase deal with Abramovich compares the Russian classification for reserves and resources with an international one — and more value goes up in smoke. “Based on the results of this activity a C1+C2 reserve of 18.6 tonnes of gold at an average ore grade of 6.3 g/t was registered with the Russian GKZ [State Reserves Committee]. A JORC [Joint Ore Reserves Committee benchmark] compliant resource audit (MICON, 2012) evaluated the deposit as containing potentially mineable gold resources of approximately 0.51 moz of Indicated and 0.04 moz of Inferred resources at an average ore grade of 5.14 g/t for the combined resources.”

Allowing again for imprecision between the two systems of classification, another 48,000 oz of gold have vanished, or 8% of asset value.

And yet Abramovich persuaded the board of directors of Highland Gold, including Eugene Shvidler, Abramovich’s long-time business partner, and Eugene Tenenbaum, his long-time financial advisor, to pay more for less. According to the Highland Gold announcement, Shvidler thinks otherwise. “The Klen addition is an important extension of Highland’s asset base,” he is quoted as saying, “and will have an immediate impact on the Company’s resources.”

Shvidler cannot have studied the annual report of the company, released this past April, carefully enough. For it reports its “JORC compliant resource base” as 11.1 million oz as of December 31, 2011. If the June 1 numbers are reliable ones, they add up to just 4.5% of the company’s aggregate.

The two Moscow institutional analysts who have examined the transaction so far haven’t been persuaded either. This is how Aton counts for comparative valuation: “Highland Gold said today that it has reached agreement to purchase the company Klen, which owns the rights for exploration and production on the same gold mine. The agreed price is $ 69 million, excluding debt. Klen is a subsidiary company, associated with Primerod International Ltd, the main shareholder of Highland Gold. An audit of the resource base of JORC indicated resource estimate of 0.5 million ounces of gold at an average grade of 5.14 grams of precious metal per tonne. In 2011 the company acquired Polymetal’s Kutyn gold deposit for $67 million to stockpile 1.2 million ounces of gold, that is, the transaction price was $ 56 per ounce of reserves. Highland Gold is going to buy Klen for $ 138 per ounce of reserves, ie almost 2.5 times more than the Polymetal transaction. The fact that the transaction will [involve] an affiliate of Primerod creates a negative opinion about the transaction.”

As arithmetic goes, that’s pretty discreet. Valentina Bogomolva, mining analyst for Uralsib Bank, does her counting this way: “The Klen gold deposit will be mined by the open pit method, with production scheduled to commence in 2015. The deposit’s JORC resources amount to 0.51 moz of indicated and 0.04 moz of inferred resources at an average ore grade of 5.14 g/t…. The seller of the Klen deposit, LLC Klen, is affiliated with Primerod Int, HGM’s main shareholder (owns 32%). The resource base is the only disclosed parameter; we value the project at an EV/reserves & resources multiple of $125/oz, which implies a 45% premium to the average price of $486/oz of Russian gold companies. Our average multiple includes Polymetal Int, the most expensive Russian gold name, which is traded at $181/oz EV/reserves & resources; we note that the resource base of all public Russian gold names includes the resources of operating facilities. Based on our estimation, Highland itself is traded at an EV/reserves & resources multiple of $31/oz and therefore the acquisition of a greenfield deposit at an EV/reserves & resources multiple of $125/oz appears to be expensive….As we consider the acquisition expensive, and given it was purchased from a party affiliated to the main shareholder company, we remain cautious on the corporate governance at Highland Gold Mining, and, based on the information disclosed by the company, we consider the deal to be dilutive for minorities. As we are not very optimistic on HGM’s operating prospects, we also reiterate that despite the fundamental upside we see in Highland, it is a relatively risky investment.”

Abramovich’s spokesman, John Mann, explains that much of this arithmetic is mistaken. That’s because Abramovich bought Klen in October 2009, Mann claims, and only a year later added the Verkhne-Krichalsakaya prospect. In Mann’s arithmetic they are separate and their reserves and resources must be counted cumulatively.

Geographically and geologically, the latter is adjacent to, surrounds, and includes the former. Or as Highland Gold claims: “The Klen licence area encompasses approximately two square kilometres and hosts an epithermal vein-type gold deposit with similar geological characteristics to other gold deposits in the region… The Verkhne-Krichalskaya exploration and mining licence incorporates the Klen licence and encompasses an area of approximately 996 square kilometres, hosting a number of small placer gold deposits. Historic exploration work on the property recognised numerous other geological features, including wide areas of hydrothermal alteration and geochemical anomalies, which are indicative of the gold prospectivity of the property. Several exploration targets have been identified which the Company believes have the potential to substantially contribute to Klen’s current resource base. In the course of the development of the Klen deposit the Company plans to systematically explore the prospects on the Verkhne-Krichalskaya license.”

According to Mann, “Klen and Verkhne-Krichalskaya are separate licenses, so yes, the counts are separate. The 18.6 tonnes is just Klen.” Klen plus Verkhne-Krichalskaya ought to sum to more than each counted one by one.

Asked to clarify which is which, and how to count, Mann says: “In October 2009, Millhouse acquired the company Klen, and with it the Klen license. We subsequently continued exploration work, more than doubling booked reserves, and prepared a technical plan for production at the site by 2015. (as per Highland release: 18.6 tons of gold reserves) In November 2010, Klen won a natural resource auction for the adjacent Verkhne-Krichalskaya block, paying 3.3 million rubles [$103,774]. We subsequently drafted an exploration plan and began initial exploration work. (when acquired, the site’s estimated resources were 32 tons gold, 69 tons silver).” According to Mann, in 2009, when Millhouse bought Klen, its reserves were just 8 tonnes of gold (257,200 oz).

How much did Abramovich (Millhouse) pay for Klen in October 2009, and from whom did he buy it? On the answers to these questions depend the valuation of the assets which Highland Gold has just paid $69 million to acquire, and the margin of Abramovich’s profit which Numis judges to be fair and reasonable. According to Mann, the seller was “a local small businessman (sorry, don’t have the name).”

As for the price Millhouse paid, Mann says: “I don’t have that figure (anyway, wouldn’t the fairness opinion be based on reserves and other current considerations?!) I honestly don’t have the name.”

The history of the Klen prospect is obscure. According to a release by the federal mine licence regulator Rosprirodnadzor, on April 6, 2006, the Klen mining licence was revoked; at the time the owner or licensee was something called Northern Ore Technologies. At that point, the asset value was zero, according to a source at the Chukotka branch of the Regional Fund for Geological Information. That’s because Northern Ore Technologies, which had first acquired the Klen licence from the state in 1999, was bankrupt.

What happened next isn’t clear. If Abramovich bought Klen from a local businessman in October 2009, as his spokesman now claims, that businessman must have acquired it from the regional administration sometime in the previous three years.

Presumably, ownership reverted to the state in April 2006, under the administration of the Chukotka regional branch of the natural resources ministry. The governor of the region until July of 2008 was Abramovich. He was a busy man; perhaps he didn’t know what was happening in the bowels of his administration, let alone in the bowels of the earth comprising the Klen and Verkhne-Krichalskaya prospects.

Asked to say what happened to the Klen license between its revocation and reversion to the state in April 2006 and the acknowledged Millhouse purchase in October 2009, Chukotka officials reveal that it was acquired in 2007 by a company called OAO Klen. In 2011, Chukotka officials say, the licence was transferred to OOO Klen. That’s a change from open-joint stock company (OAO) to limited liability company (OOO) — a corporate restructuring, but not a change of ownership. Abramovich appears to have behind the ownership of the Klen licence from 2007, when he was still governor.

The Chukotka officials also reveal that because of the bankruptcy of Northern Ore Technologies and the reversion of the Klen license to the state, the subsequent sale transaction was a “quiet one” at a “low price”. Just how low isn’t on record. According to one Chukotka official, “the story is very muddy and it’s difficult to dig out. Who has outbid [another] and for whose benefit he acted it is difficult to say. It’s possible there was a special purpose vehicle [for someone]. If you dig, the fate of many fields comes up as very strange.”

Step back further in time, because there is something about Abramvoich’s latest deal which is reminiscent of one he arranged in Chukotka nine years ago. In September 2003 Abramovich was almost three years into his governorship. That was one reason he went to a great deal of trouble to disguise a transaction that month in which he got Highland Gold to pay him $34.9 million for a gold prospect he owned, also in Chukotka region, called Maiskoye. On that occasion, he used a front-man named Oleg Savchenko. The evidence of Abramovich’s part and profit in the transaction came directly from Christine Coignard, an employee of Highland Gold at the time. Five and a half years later, Highland Gold sold Maiskoye for $109 million, so if there were sore feelings about Abramovich’s earlier price and profit-taking, this deal helped salve them. And of course , as a stakeholder in Highland Gold Abramovich was entitled to a one-third share in the threefold profit. Here’s the rest of this tale.

So was Abramovich behind the local businessman who bought Klen from the regional branch of the Ministry of Natural Resources a year after the local regulator had taken it away from somebody who had run out of cash? And how much did Abramovich pay when he officially got his hands on it? This is the arithmetic Abramovich isn’t acknowledging. According to spokesman Mann, “you’ve obviously not looked in the right place because we acquired the company Klen in October 2009. The previous owner was not affiliated with Millhouse. But I am impressed by the level of imagination involved in your giant leaps of logic! Your assumptions are, of course, entirely inaccurate.”

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The Amazing Toys Of Russia's NEW Wealthiest Oligarch

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Alisher Usmanov is now Russia's richest man thanks to the investment he made in Facebook three years ago. 

The oligarch, whose investment term DST has invested in several Silicon Valley startups and sold $1.4 billion worth of Facebook stock during the company's IPO, is currently worth some $18.1 billion, according to Forbes.

While the rich and famous hope to pick up a piece at Sotheby's auction, Usmanov was able to poach the entire collection before it even went for sale. He is also building a Roman bath under his house.

Usmanov owns Beechwood house, a Victorian mansion in London that he bought for $77 million.

Source: bornrich.com



Usmanov's neighbors in Highgate, London include Jude Law, Annie Lennox and George Michael.

Source: bornrich.com



Usmanov is in the process of building a huge, Roman-style bathing complex and underground swimming pool in his Victorian mansion.

Source: bornrich.com



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South African Oligarch Beats Oleg Deripaska To The Pot In Guinea

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MOSCOW—A group of South Africans, led by Tokyo Sexwale, has devised a scheme to take over mineral assets and mining concessions in the west African republic of Guinea, which the government plans to renationalize after revoking deals struck by previous Guinean governments. The Sexwale scheme is a growing threat to Oleg Deripaska’s Rusal in Guinea, as the offers Deripaska has proposed to Guinean President Alpha Conde and his family miss their mark.

On the eve of Rusal’s annual general meeting of shareholders in Hong Kong, due on June 15, there has been no fresh warning to Rusal shareholders that their Guinean bauxite mines and alumina refinery are facing confiscation, and transfer to a state mining company controlled, indirectly, by the South Africans. These Guinean assets account for more than half of Rusal’s global bauxite reserves. On last year’s production results, the Guinea bauxite mines represent 36% of Rusal’s annual bauxite production of 13.5 million tonnes; 7% of Rusal’s alumina output of 8.2 million tonnes. Both totals were down below past-year volumes.

In its latest challenge, the Guinean government charges Rusal with fraudulent under-reporting of output figures. A billion-dollar claim by the Guinean government dating back to 2009 accuses Rusal of under-counting the volume of its bauxite and alumina exports, and under-paying on taxes.

The only reference Rusal has made to the potential losses is this line in the annual financial report for 2011: “Operations in these countries involve risks that typically do not exist in other markets, including reconsideration of privatisation terms in certain countries where the Group operates following changes in governing political powers.” In its May 2012 financial report, Rusal also claims that the government’s position in the Guinean courts “has no merit and the risk of any cash outflow in connection with this claim is low and therefore no provision has been recorded in this regard in these consolidated financial statements.”

The collapse of Rusal’s position in Guinea this year is one of the targets for legal challenges against Deripaska’s management by shareholding partners, Victor Vekselberg, Len Blavatnik, and Mikhail Prokhorov.

Rusal’s share price is currently fixing in the Hong Kong market at an all-time low of between HK$4.20 and HK$4.60 (54 and 59 US cents). At US$9 billion, the company’s value in the market is $2 billion less than its bank debts. The Russian government’s official and unofficial stake in the company is now worth about $2.6 billion, two and a half times less than it was worth when the Kremlin agreed to bail Rusal out of insolvency and default in November 2008; then underwrite Deripaska’s initial public offering of shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in January of 2010.

Sexwale is one of South Africa’s wealthiest black leaders, with substantial holdings in the minerals and mining sector through his Mvelaphanda Group . He is also the Minister for Human Settlements (slums) in the current South African government, a critic of President Jacob Zuma, and a potent challenger at the next presidential election in 2014.

According to sources in Johannesberg, Sexwale is discussing with Eurasian National Resources Corporation (ENRC) a plan to buy into mining interests in Guinea. London-listed ENRC is one of Kazakhstan’s dominant mining companies, producing iron-ore, ferro-alloys, copper, coal, bauxite and alumina. Although ENRC is smaller than Rusal as a global bauxite and alumina producer, if Sexwale manages to oust Deripaska from Guinea, that would change dramatically. Currently, ENRC’s market capitalization is $8.1 billion.

Sexwale is believed to be the power behind two obscure British Virgin Island vehicles, one called Palladino Holdings and another called Floras Bell, which are managed by Olaf Walter Hennig. An investigation by David Gleason in Business Day of Johannesberg reports that a year ago Hennig arranged for a loan of US$25 million to finance the start-up of a new Guinean state mining company. The new mining code, drafted by Conde’s advisors, would grant that new state entity a free 15% stake in the country’s mining projects, and the option to buy another 20%.

Behind Hennig and the $25 million loan, according to Gleason and confirmed independently by sources in Conakry, the Guinean capital, are Sexwale; Mark Willcox, the chief executive of Mvelaphanda, and several other businessmen of South African, Polish, and British extraction. One of them reported by Gleason is Ian Hannam, a City of London financier who tried to arrange Rusal’s float on the London Stock Exchange in 2007, but failed.

Guinean sources say Sexwale, Willcox and Hennig are the control shareholders of the BVI entities. A report in the Sunday Times of London in May claimed that Hennig was a “shadowy middleman”, and that the Palladino loan had been signed in April 2011 by the Guinean finance minister and a local proxy for Palladino. The terms look as if they were copied out of the Russian loans-for-shares book. If the Guinean state entity defaults on repayment of the Palladino loan, Sexwale and his pals would be eligible to convert the debt into a 30% stake in the state mining company and its assets.

A senior Guinean official says this is one of several non-transparent deals arranged by President Conde which have convinced BHP Billiton to withdraw from concessions they currently hold in Guinean bauxite and iron-ore. Rusal’s concessions are a target, the source adds, because of the personal falling-out between Conde and Deripaska chronicled here.

Guinean officials who have tried to persuaded Conde to continue the reforms initiated by former Mining Minister Mahmoud Thiam had hoped the new code would establish a transparent foundation for renegotiation of many of the Guinean resource deals. Those have enriched the country’s rulers, deprived the country of taxes and investment, and left its resources in the ground. The reformers suspect Conde of appearing to endorse the public goals while secretly bargaining for private gains to be channelled through newly created entities backed by fresh alliances. Sexwale, said a Conakry source, “and the South African gang were [President Conde’s] business partners through the ANC [African National Congress, the ruling South African political party] from before he became president. There is that trust and an agreement to do business that predates everything.”

Other Guinean sources contend the Palladino loan is illegal, because it hasn’t been ratified by the Guinean parliament; because violations of US and UK anti-corruption laws are suspected, and because the government in Conakry has pledged that in return for debt relief from the Club of Paris government creditors, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it cannot pledge or transfer national resource assets bilaterally.

“The [share] pledge made in this [Palladino loan] agreement by the Government cannot be implemented. Under Guinea’s procurement and asset disposal law, any transaction with state-owned assets with a value exceeding 800 million Guinea francs ($120,000) has to be made through a public tender process. [The Palladino loan] also violates Article 150 of the new mining code which says the same things. Perhaps the [Palladino] consortium, aware of the provisions of the mining code, part of which they may even have drafted, secured their agreement five months ahead of the release of the mining code in the hope the new law would not be retroactive. Too bad! The public procurement law overrides the mining code.”

A high Guinean source describes the Palladino scheme an “an attempt to seize the assets of the Guinean Government by the back door, on the cheap and risk free. Essentially, whoever is behind Paladino has found it easy to penetrate the higher echelons of the new Guinean administration. The $25 million loan, far from being a loan, can actually be perceived as ‘entry ticket’ or ‘signature bonus’. All the consortium has to do is bide their time seat and wait.”

An advisor in Conakry says that for Rusal to wait for Conde’s relationship with Deripaska to improve plays into the South Africans’ hands now. “Deripaska and Conde had a marriage of convenience that worked in the beginning and each side thought it would extract maximum value for very little in return. Neither was able to deliver to the other’s expectations.”

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A Black Hole For Evraz And A Black Eye For Roman Abramovich

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MOSCOW—Evraz, the Russian steelmaker listed on the London Stock Exchange main board, is being sued in the UK High Court for $35.8 million by a group of Swiss investors over a failed project to build a terminal for iron-ore and coking coal at Yuzhny port, on the Ukrainian Black Sea coast near Odessa. The dispute is over an asset on which Evraz has put a substantially higher value on its own balance-sheets than the Swiss investors are claiming in valuation and compensation in court.

The High Court claim papers were filed on April 26. At the same time, a court in Cyprus agreed to impose a freeze over money in the accounts of an Evraz subsidiary operating in Cyprus called Watney Ltd.

The court claims indicate that Evraz had signed an agreement in 2007 with Revolution! Enterprises, a British Virgin Islands-registered company owned by a Swiss investment concern called Leman Services et Investissements Sarl to construct the new terminal. Their joint venture vehicle was a Cyprus-registered company called Frotora. Evraz company records confirm it owned 51% of Frotora.

Records at the Swiss canton of Vaud indicate that Leman is a limited liability entity, first established in 2002, and jointly owned by Bruce Littman and Daniel Littman. The former is listed as senior vice president at EFG, the Geneva-based private banking group. EFG’s Cyprus banking subsidiary is also identified in the court documents as involved in the port project.

The plan of the joint venture was acquire the land for the terminal, relocating a village of 120 people, and spend up to $500 million on construction of new facilities, including railway, roads and berths. The site, according to the Yuzhny port authority, is outside the port boundaries, and is owned by a Ukrainian company called Prichaly Kominterna. This is described in the court papers as having been owned by Frotora.

In its annual report for 2007, Evraz reported it had bought several production assets in Ukraine, including the Sukha Balka iron ore mining and processing complex, the Dnepropetrovsk Iron and Steel Works, and three coking plants. “These acquisitions,” Evraz announced in the annual report, “will allow us to increase our iron ore self-sufficiency and ensure further upstream integration. It will also create captive intra-group demand for coking coal for the surplus production of Evraz Group’s coal mines in Siberia.” For that deal, Evraz paid $1.1 billion in cash and 4.2 million in shares.

The annual report also discloses: “In 2007, the Group acquired a 51% ownership interest in Frotora Holdings Ltd. (Cyprus). This purchase does not qualify for a business combination as the acquired company does not constitute a business. The company’s assets comprise only rights under a long-term lease of land to be used for a construction of a commercial sea port in the Ukraine. These rights were valued at $65 million and included in contract terms category of the intangible assets.” The same notice reappears in Evraz’s annual report for 2008.

Evraz was aiming, the 2007 report leaves no doubt, to use the port to service its newly acquired iron-ore mine, coking batteries, and steel mill. “With this transaction Evraz Group also aims to enter one of the lowest cost steel producing regions, and thus to further diversify Evraz Group’s asset geography.” Note that if Evraz was valuing its 51% stake in the port project at start-up at $65 million, then its joint venture Swiss partner’s stake must have been worth $62.5 million.

The two partners also agreed that Evraz would be obliged to buy out the 49.05% stake in the project owned by Revolution! Enterprises if the latter exercised its put option to sell at a price fixed by an independent market appraisal of the terminal asset. Then the steel and commodity trade crisis struck Evraz in autumn of 2008, triggering the group’s near-insolvency with more than $10 billion in debts, and the Kremlin was asked to rescue Abramovich and bail out his assets in the US. Evraz then ran into trouble over the Sukha Balka iron-ore mine with Ukrainian shareholder, Igor Kolomoisky.

In its annual report for 2010, Evraz discloses that it had unilaterally devalued the port project assets and rejected its Swiss partner’s claim. “In 2010, the non-controlling shareholder’s right to put a 49% share in Frotora Holdings Ltd. (‘Frotora’) to the Group at fair value of the ownership interest became exercisable. The Group derecognised a 49% ownership interest in Frotora amounting to $6 million and accrued a liability for the same amount. The assets of Frotora comprised mostly the rights under a long-term lease of land to be used for a construction of a commercial sea port in Ukraine. These rights are included in contract terms category of the intangible assets. In 2010, the Group recognised an impairment loss of $30 million in respect of these rights due to the change in plans for the use of this land.”

That statement was prepared in March of 2011. It appears to suggest that it valued the Swiss 49% at $6 million, and its own 51% at $30 million. The statement also appears to imply that evraz didn’t intend to pay its partner the $6 million, but was charging its own balance-sheet, and thus its shareholders, $30 million.

In the same month, another valuation, prepared for Revolution! Enterprises and Leman by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), estimated $35.8 million as the price of its stake for sale to Evraz under the option agreement. Compared to Evraz’s reported valuation in 2007 and 2008, this amounted to a reduction of 43%.

According to the UK and Cyprus court documents, Evraz refused to agree to pay anything to the Swiss. But it has subsequently sold its own stake in the project in April of this year for $9.2 million, 50% less than the Swiss have demanded. The latter then applied to the Cypriot court to freeze whatever money may have come to Watney for this transaction. The freeze order is dated April 27.

Kseniya Petrushko, a spokesman for Evraz in Moscow, says the company is not commenting on the court claims for the time being.

The buyer of Evraz’s stake is reported in the court documents to be a Ukrainian company called Bravex. It is identified on the internet as a wholesaler and distributor of imported goods, including cars, and a specialist in cargo handling and warehousing. Whether it is connected to the major Ukrainian steelmaking and mining groups is not known. Noone picks up the telephone at its Kharkiv office numbers.

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Alrosa Boldly Offers To Trade Its Gas Fields For LUKoil's Diamonds

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MOSCOW—Alrosa has announced new strategic targets until the end of 2021, following this week’s meeting of the Supervisory Board, as Alrosa’s board of directors is known. How much of the projected growth will depend on Alrosa getting the Kremlin to persuade Vagit Alekperov of LUKoil to do what he doesn’t want to do is the big question for them all — especially for Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, who has been demonstrating sharp interest recently in the price he can arrange for an Alrosa asset sale.

An Alrosa statement says its current diamond production level of about 34 million carats per annum will be lifted to between 38 and 40 million carats, a cumulative growth rate of 6%, by increasing production at the new underground mines in Yakutia, and expanding open-pit production at mines in the Arkhangelsk region of northwest Russia. At the same time, the company’s diamond reserves are to be lifted to 1.19 billion carats, a 61% increase over their present level.

To fulfil these targets and retain over De Beers what Alrosa refers to as “leadership on the world market”, the company says it is counting on a smooth and successful transition to underground mining in Yakutia (Sakha Republic). But it is dark five hundred metres underground, and the geological risks and costs of mining diamonds at that level are notoriously uncertain, as Alrosa acknowledges. “The share of rough diamonds from open-pit mines will be systematically reduced from 72.8% in 2011 down to 40% in 2021, and the volume of rough diamonds from underground mines will grow from 27.2 up to over 60%, respectively. However, there are objective risks of production reduction, which are conditioned by geological features of the deposits and some possible changes in mining conditions at the mines under construction.”

 

As a hedge against these risks, Alrosa says it aims to expand output at Severalmaz, which is developing an open-pit mine at the Lomonosov diamond field in Arkhangelsk. In its latest annual report for the year 2011, Severalmaz reports it produced 556,800 carats. This appears to be the design capacity of the mine.

According to Alrosa’s new plan, by 2021 it hopes to lift its diamond sale revenues to about $12 billion, an almost threefold jump compared to last year. This is achievable, the company is claiming, if diamond demand grows by 38% to 2021, according to the Alrosa forecast, and if it can capitalize on higher grades and qualities from the underground sources. Investment to get at the underground stones is estimated to total Rb234.6 billion ($7 billion). Additional reserves, Alrosa says, will come from “the possibility of purchasing diamond-mining assets, first of all, on the territory of the Russian Federation.”

This statement appears to be a discreet but categorical rejection of reports over several months that Suleiman Kerimov, a Moscow businessman who represents the interests of government officials, is proposing that Alrosa attempt to acquire BHP Billiton’s Canadian mines. Independent sources say BHP has closed the bid book for the assets, and Alrosa is not participating.

Another source of potential production and reserve growth is the Grib pipe, or the Verkohtina project, which had been developed by Archangel Diamond Corporation (ADC) until it was seized by LUKoil, the owner of Arkhangelshgeoldobycha (AGD), a regional diamond explorer. The Grib site is less than 50 kilometres from the Lomonosov field. Reserves were estimated by De Beers, when it owned ADC, at 98 million tonnes of kimberlite to a depth of 500 metres, containing an estimated 67 million recoverable carats. The grade was estimated by De Beers from 69 to 82 carats per 100 tonnes.

According to the mine plan of LUKoil and AGD, it aims at excavation of 4.5 million tonnes of ore in the first year of operation; 58 million carats over the first sixteen years; 3.6 million carats output per annum; and a mine life of up to 35 years, depending on the underground conditions, waterlogging, and costs. Adding the Grib pipe to Alrosa’s reserves would make about 15% of this week’s Alrosa estimate of its aggregate increase in reserves.

LUKoil has been advertising its desire to sell off the Verkhotina project since 2009; the offer was renewed publicly in February of this year. In a newspaper report this week in Moscow, Alrosa appears to be offering to swap gas fields it owns in the Russian fareast for the Grib pipe. According to a report by Maria Yegikyan, an Alfa Bank analyst, “Alrosa’s gas assets include Geotransgaz and Urengoy Gas Company, with a reserve base of 187bcm of natural gas and 26.4mt of gas condensate in the YANAO region. The gas assets are expected to start production toward the end of 2012, with output expected to reach 1.8bcm of natural gas and 250kt of condensate pa. The company’s investments in the respective assets seem to be equal at around $800m…LUKoil has not expressed interest in Alrosa’s gas assets, leaving room to question whether LUKoil is interested in the transaction.”

Spokesman Vladimir Semakov said LUKoil is not commenting on any contact it may have with Alrosa on this issue. This week, following the signing of an agreement with the Arkhangeslk region governor, Alekperov announced that the Grib mine will be commissioned in 2013, and that LUKoil is planning to invest more than $850 million in the project.

Alrosa has also been reported to be in negotiations to trade the gas assets to the state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft, which may in turn be absorbed by Rosneft. The cash valuation which has been reported for the Zarubezhneft deal is between $609 million, which Alrosa paid for Geotransgaz and Urengoy in 2009, and $1.1 billion, the price required for its buy-back agreement with VTB Bank in 2011. The pricing of these transactions has apparently allowed an exceptional amount of socialist sharing on the part of the leading liberal reformer in the Russian government, former Finance Minister and Alrosa board chairman, Alexei Kudrin.

If the diamonds are part of a larger deal between the state oil companies and LUKoil, Alekperov may be obliged to take a lower price than he wants to let Alrosa have the Grib pipe.

Diamond industry sources in Moscow don’t believe Alrosa has much leverage against LUKoil. “Alrosa doesn’t have administrative resources in a contest with Lukoil. Regarding the administrative resources, these are limited to Yakutia and the diamond-consuming public. Other administrative resources they do not have.

Another source close to Alrosa says: “Alrosa is unlikely to be able to use their administrative resources to exchange assets. [About alternative buyers LUKoil can approach for selling Grib] that is a question. Really, except for Alrosa, it is unlikely anyone will be able to engage this asset. On the one hand, this asset is hardly of interest to someone else, as far as I know of the condition of this asset, as it requires astronomical investment. An economy of costs and investments there can only be realized [at Grib] when applied in connection with Severalmaz. On the other hand, as far as I know, all these [legal] proceedings, in which Lukoil is involved with the Canadian side [ADC], are not over yet; there is an opposition war and the conflict has not yet been settled. So it is not quite understandable how the [swap] transaction can be completed, if the proceedings have not yet ended.”

The source also believes that if Alrosa has the means, it can develop new diamond mines in Yakutia. “There are potential resources which need to be explored and put on the balance sheet. With appropriate investments Alrosa could find assets in Yakutia. The only problem is that during the entire existence of Alrosa [since 1993], investment in the exploration of potential new fields has been limited. What was exploited was left over from Soviet times.”

alekperov alrosa

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Oleg Deripaska Suffered A Major Defeat In Nigeria

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MOSCOW—An 8-year long case charging Oleg Deripaska and his Russian Aluminium (Rusal) group with fraud and corruption in acquiring aluminium assets, gas and electricity supply and port outlet in a rigged privatization scheme has ended in Deripaska’s defeat and the loss of his assets. The court ruling was issued on Friday, July 6. In Nigeria.

On the eve of the start of Mikhail Chernoy’s (Michael Cherney) trial for recovery of his 13% shareholding in Rusal, to commence in the UK High Court today, the Nigerian Supreme Court judgement by a unanimous 5-judge panel is automatically endorsed by the US federal court, which had ceded jurisdiction over Rusal for the claim, on condition Deripaska submitted to the Nigerian courts. The ruling cannot be appealed; and for an asset which cost $3.8 billion to build, it is the most costly defeat Deripaska has suffered in the international courts to date.

The court has ruled it was illegal for the Nigerian government’s privatization agency, the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) to sell the Aluminium Smelter Company of Nigeria (ALSCON) to Rusal, and it has nullified the deal.

Rusal executives hadn’t been expecting the Nigerian defeat. Over the weekend, the Nigerian press has been reporting a Rusal country representative, Albert Dyabin, as saying the company would be bound by the Supreme Court verdict.

In Moscow, as litigation from former partners, shareholders and former employees exposes Deripaska’s management mistakes, his senior executives have begun fighting among themselves. Following the collapse of a private arrangement between Deripaska and the President of Guinea, Alpha Conde, Yakov Itskov, who runs Rusal’s worldwide raw material procurement, recently asked Deripaska to discharge Victor Boyarkin, who heads Rusal’s security division. Itskov is reported to have told Deripaska that Rusal’s troubles in Africa reflect the failure of Boyarkin’s strategy of combining soft inducements to politicians to cooperate, combined with hostile measures if they won’t. According to another Rusal insider, problems from mismanagement and corruption are also brewing in the South American republic of Guyana, where Rusal bought a bauxite mine and new mineable reserves in 2006, and where there have been production strikes, widespread protests, and Chinese competition.

Rusal sources believe Boyarkin has survived the challenge because key government officials and shareholders have supported him – at least until the new challenges emerged in recent weeks from Victor Vekselberg and Sergei Stepashin.

Rusal’s lawyers are also at odds with one another, as each new litigation triggers costly recriminations inside the company and the inevitable leaks. One insider says he has witnessed hostilities between the Bryan Cave law firm, whose partner Paul Hauser, has been a long-term legal advisor in London, and Sue Prevezer of Quinn Emanuel, the firm Deripaska is hiring for his defence in the Chernoy trial. According to a posting by Prevezer on her firm’s website, her engagement by Deripaska in the Chernoy case is “one of the largest claims currently in the London High Court.”

The Rusal prospectus, issued in December 2009 for the sale of the company’s shares, reported its takeover of the Nigerian government’s 77.5% stake in ALSCON in December 2006, followed by the purchase of a German-held stake of 7.5% in 2008. The Nigerian government retained 15%.

Rusal’s winning bid was $250 million in shares, conditions, and $130 million in cash; with this Rusal managed to arrange with the Nigerian government’s privatization agency to overrule a $410 million cash offer by the Bancorp Financial Investment Group Divino Corporation (BFIG), a Nigerian-American group based in Los Angeles and headed by Reuben Jaja.

Rusal announced “the $250 million purchase price will cover the purchase of the shares in Alscon, as well as the dredging of the river. The company, together with Ferrostaal AG and the Government of Nigeria, also plans to invest an additional $150 million over the next three years to complete, refurbish and modernise Alscon.” That was in 2006. In the Rusal share prospectus, the company said it had invested $76 million, less than half its promise.

On account of the conditions tied to the bid, the Nigerian government ended up promising to subsidize Rusal’s plan for the smelter with more money than Rusal itself promised to pay.

BFIG launched its first claim in US federal district court (Manhattan) charging Rusal with conspiracy to commit fraud . Rusal counter-charged that “this case is entirely without merit and now welcomes the court’s decision.” What that meant was that the US federal judge William Connor, followed by three appeals court judges, ordered Rusal to face the Nigerian courts, rather than the US courts, on BFIG’s claims.

Here is the full story, as it developed over the years.

The judgement of the Nigeria’s highest court, delivered by Justice John Fabiyi, runs to 59 pages. It overrules decisions by the trial court and the Court of Appeal, which went in favour of Rusal’s deal with the Nigerian government. The final judgement concludes there had been a binding contract for sale of the state shareholding in ALSCON to BFIG before Rusal stepped and persuaded BPE to reverse itself. BPE had improperly and illegally intervened, the court has decided, and that action has now been reversed.

The court has also decided that the June 14, 2004, BFIG bid of $410 million for 77.5% of ALSCON’s shares constituted then, and now, a binding contract between the parties which the government must now honour. Payment by BFIG of a bid bond of $1 million secured this contract, the court added, referring to BFIG as the appellant and the BPE and the respondent:

argument

According to Judge Fabiyi, “there is no doubt in my mind that an order of specific performance of the contract between the parties is clearly warranted and is hereby ordered as prayed. The appeal is meritorious in the extreme. It is hereby allowed. The decisions of the two courts below are hereby set aside. The claims of the appellant [BFIG] at the trial court are hereby granted.”

The Nigerian government was also ordered to pay court costs of 50,000Nairas ($311) to BFIG.

According to the Rusal prospectus. “ALSCON is currently a loss-generating asset and is not expected to become profitable until a capital investment program has been completed with the smelter reaching its full capacity of 197 thousand tonnes per annum. A feasibility study for internal investment approval was completed in September 2008. The program requires an investment of approximately US$298 million over the period of 2009-2011, of which US$76 million had been spent as of 30 June 2009. The debt restructuring agreements generally prohibit the Group from incurring capital expenditure in relation to this program through the end of the override period but permit the Group to fund the program on a project finance (non-recourse) basis or through certain equity investments in the project. The Group is currently considering a disposal of 50% of its interest in ALSCON to a strategic investor.” The same prospectus reported a book value for the Nigerian assets as $183 million in 2007.

BFIG’s court case deterred anyone from buying.

According to Jimmie Williams of Burnham Brown, one of BFIG’s lawyers, the July 6 Supreme Court ruling orders the government to cancel the sale to Rusal, and to sell instead to BFIG at “a mutually agreed share purchase agreement for execution by the parties to enable the plaintiff (BFIG) to pay an agreed bid price.” Also, the government, which was the defendant in the Nigerian court action, is barred by the court from “inviting any further bidding for the sale and acquisition of ALSCON in violation of the contract between the plaintiff and defendant and or from negotiating to sell or otherwise handing over ALSCON to any person in violation of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.”

Rusal has yet to disclose Friday’s loss to its shareholders on the company website.

In the 2009 prospectus, Rusal had told share buyers: “Although a decision against the Group may have an adverse effect on the Group’s ALSCON operations in Nigeria, including the potential loss of ALSCON and consequent loss of revenue, the Directors do not believe that any resulting liabilities will materially adversely affect the Group’s financial position or its operations as a whole.”

A US Embassy cable from the Nigerian capital of Abuja, dated August 2004 and published by Wikileaks in 2011, told the State Department the Nigerian government’s action towards Rusal reflected “a lack of transparency in the bidding process, and perhaps some corruption as well.”

BFIG’s Jaja said: “In over eight years, fighting with the Federal Government and the corrupt elite and multinationals was not easy. The plant has suffered tremendous decay. We have given in everything we have in the fight to recover the plant. We have suffered damages, including partners who have since forgotten about the project as well as others who livelihood have been negatively impacted. We are determined to work with our partners to do to ensure that we turn the plant around to the benefit of the people, particularly the people of the Niger Delta for which the plant was built.”

Says lawyer Williams: “The Court noted that Rusal took the risk to purchase ALSCON when they knew its rights were still being litigated, and, thus they bought it at their own risk. Guess that gamble didn’t pay off.”

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Oleg Deripaska's Secret Account Books Revealed

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Fifteen years ago, the American Journal of Psychiatry reported research that not all obsessive-compulsive disorders are alike. Two individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder, the scientific evidence showed, may have totally different and non-overlapping symptom patterns. For example, the obsession with counting, hoarding, arranging and collecting doesn’t usually accompany the compulsion for hand-washing, religious ritualism, sexual aggression, or vice versa.

At yesterday’s opening presentations in the UK High Court in the case of Michael Cherney v Oleg Deripaska, the evidence of Deripaska’s meticulously recorded and coded account books was revealed for the first time. No major Russian business figure has ever been obliged to reveal such intimate financial data in a public forum. “The balance sheets,” according to Cherney’s advocate Mark Howard QC, “are documents of the utmost importance in the case.”

Deripaska is recorded as calling the files his private cash registers; printed versions for 1997 to 2000, running to about 200 pages, have been submitted. They are still being analysed by forensic and accounting experts for Cherney’s legal team. The accounts are for the years when Deripaska claims he had no business relationship with Cherney, and was forging by himself the aluminium business that has become United Company Rusal.

“It will become clear to the Court,” Howard has submitted in a written presentation to the presiding judge, Justice Andrew Smith, “that Mr Deripaska has an eye for recording and reviewing fine detail. There are no sums so trivial that they do not feature in a record or journal, no outgoing too meagre to go unnoted.”

From mid-2000 on, Deripaska has claimed his special bookkeeping was converted from spreadsheets, balance-sheets and paper summaries to a computer recording programme called FINPROVOD (Финансовый Проводник — Financial Explorer). But Deripaska and his lawyers have resisted disclosing the full FINPROVOD archive he has been keeping for the past 12 years. In January of this year, Cherney’s lawyers requested proof of the authenticity of the records that had been handed over to date. Then in April, Cherney requested disclosure of all the FINPROVOD entries through December 2004. Deripaska resisted, and so in May Justice Smith ordered him to disclose the records. They were not delivered until June, and they are still being analysed.

In the registers, Deripaska records payments to himself as Code A3. These are “payments and expenses related to the Defendant’s [Deripaska] business and charitable expenses” and “some payments and expenses that related to the Defendant personally.” Payor code for Cherney is revealed as A4. Deripaska and his lawyers resisted revealing this information until six weeks ago, on May 25. Cherney’s lawyers have told the judge they are still searching for Deripaska’s cash registers for the years before 1997, when they have provided evidence from Cherney’s records of substantial payments and loans to get Deripaska started in the aluminium business as Cherney’s employee and then his partner. By 1999, the Cherney loans Deripaska acknowledges as still owing in his diary amounted to $210.5 million.

The new evidence is potentially devastating for Deripaska’s defence that Cherney was a gangster, with whom he had no business relationship, and to whom money was paid reluctantly because of extortion and threats against his person and his business.

According to the presentation by Howard for Cherney, disclosed in court yesterday, “the 1997 balance sheet consists of 16 spreadsheet tabs, comprising 24 printed pages. It records a financial position at month ends and reflects changing asset and liability positions. There is a combined balance sheet for the Radom Foundation and Sibal and bank balances for various companies including Nash Investments, Radom Foundation, Bluzwed Foundation, Meganetty Foundation, Bluzwed Metals, and CCT. There is also a ―loans receivable section, and a more detailed “debtors” spreadsheet.”

“The balance sheet and associated spreadsheets for 1999 comprise 110 printed pages contained in 21 tabs. Once again there are separate balance sheets for Radom and Sibal, and inter-company loans between them. The Radom balance sheet shows undistributed profit for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 and drawings for A1, A2, A3 and A4. There is a new entry ―A4.1 which shows the sum of US$13,636,189 from January to December 1999. This was the closing balance for the previous year of the sum treated as a loan to Mr Makhmudov, and Mr Deripaska has alleged that this loan to Mr Makhmudov was written off as part of the krysha [[protection]. The inconsistencies between this account and the contemporaneous documents will be explored in evidence. So far as the Sibal balance sheet is concerned, the liabilities reflect a loan from Radom of US$210.5 million at the end of 1999.”

“The balance sheet for the first half of 2000 – those disclosed seem to have been prepared in July 2000 and cover the first six months of the year – are considerably shorter. The balance sheets of Radom and Sibal are shown separately, with inter-company loan balances between Radom and Sibal shown as to and from GSA Cyprus. In the Radom balance sheet the profits for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and the ―current year (2000) are set out for A1, A2 and A4 (including A4.1). There are no further drawings: the opening balance remains the same throughout the first 6 months of 2000. One striking feature of the 2000 balance sheet – at a time when cash payments were required from Sibal pursuant to the merger agreement between Sibal and Sibneft – is that there are no dolya [alleged protection] payments. On the contrary the individuals alleged to represent OCGs [organized crime groups] are making, and can be seen to be making, cash transfers into the business. The pattern of payments, and the manner and care in which the various payments are recorded, cannot be explained as some form of krysha, however ―sophisticated the operation is said to be. This is clearly a partnership at work.”

“Although Mr Deripaska has not disclosed any balance sheets or equivalent documents for the period after June 2000, a number of forward-looking cash flow projections have been disclosed. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that, on alternative scenarios, repayments are forecast of the substantial amounts due to ―IKM and ―II (Ivan Ivanovich) (as recorded in the 2000 balance sheet) over the second half of 2000 and to the end of 2001.237 One of the forecasts has a projection for May to December 2001. It projects a payment of US$7.4 million from ―II in July 2000: an amount that comes in from Mr Cherney‘s company Arufa to Fastact on 24 July 2000.239 Some of the forecasts make different assumptions as to monthly income of RA – presumably the merged business with Mr Roman Abramovich – and those who prepared the spreadsheets and project repayment state ‘we believe that we can roll over loans’.”.

“Mr Deripaska‘s explanation as to how this process is compatible with the OCG-imposed krysha arrangement for which he contends is awaited.”

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